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The goal of this empirical study is to identify empirically and on a panel basis how non-
traditional bank activities affect directly the profitability and risk profiles of the financial 
institutions involved in such activities. Through a d taset that covers 1,725 U.S. financial 
institutions involved in non-traditional bank activi ies spanning the period 2000-2013 and 
the methodology of panel cointegration, the empirical findings document that non-traditional 
bank activities exert a positive effect on both theprofitability and the insolvency risk. The 
results could be important for regulators given they could serve as a pre-warning signal that 
sends a clear message to regulators about the potential systemic risk that exists within the 
financial markets. 
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The long-term role of non-traditional banking in profitability and risk 
profiles: Evidence from a panel of U.S. banking institutions 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The introduction of the U.S. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 eliminated 
any functional barriers between commercial and investm nt bank activities, 
allowing the U.S. banks to offer a full range of financial services. At the same time, 
the adoption of the securitization model in which banks allocate their funding not 
only to lending activities, but also to asset securitization, provided the field for 
additional funding mechanisms, known as non-traditional items. As a result, the 
new banking model gave rise to a reduced need of traditional bank services, to the 
presence of higher systematic risks, and to the need of more effective regulation 
(Cetorelli and Persitiani, 2012; Claessens and Ratnovski, 2013). Gambacorta and 
van Rixtel (2013) argue that the recent financial crisis triggered a reassessment of 
the argument that non-traditional bank activities can offer value added to banks’ 
profitability. 
The non-traditional bank activities, such as items a sociated with 
securitization, investment banking, advisory fees, venture capital, and non-hedging 
derivatives, are totally differentiated from traditional bank activities, i.e. deposit 
taking and lending functioning (Pozsar et al., 2010), while they can be a substantial 
source of systemic risk, both directly and through their interconnectedness with the 
traditional bank activities. Higher levels of diversifications make the bank system 
too complex and, thus, substantial agency problems may arise. 
The goal of this work is to shed light on the empirical identification about 
how non-traditional activities conducted by U.S. banks influence their profitability-
risk trade-off. The novelties of the paper come to fill certain voids in the relevant 
literature, such as: i) by considering a very recent period –including the financial 
crisis 2007 event- that no other study has done it b fore, ii) a number of robustness 
empirical tests that sharpen the interpretation of our findings and lend clear support 
to our baseline results, and iii) by providing the extent to which disaggregated non-















The empirical findings provide evidence that such non-traditional bank 
activities exert a positive effect on both the profitability and the risk profiles of 
banking institutions involved in such activities. In terms of the disaggregation 
framework, the findings show that there is not any u ified behavior across all the 
components of such non-traditional bank activities. For a number of components, 
related to mortgage-backed securities, there is a statistically significant value-
creating and risk-increasing empirical finding, albeit it is smaller vis-à-vis the 
aggregate outcome, implying that these components rquire banks to take relatively 
long-term stakes in assets. These findings highlight the need of regulatory bodies to 
better monitor the market that ignited the financial risis event. 
This paper is related to the corporate finance literature and to the role of 
diversification costs emerging from non-traditional activities along with the effects 
on the regular bank system’s valuations and risk profiles. This literature has 
exemplified the limited diversification gains in terms of higher profitability and 
reduced risk for those institutions that attempt to diversify their portfolios of 
activities, i.e. traditional and non-traditional activities, while a number of studies in 
the literature supports the view that banks must focus on those lines of business that 
their management has a comparative advantage over alternative activities. The main 
strand in this literature focuses on the regulatory arbitrage obtained by the business 
of non-traditional banking (Acharya et al., 2013). According to this view, banks 
conduct non-traditional bank activities so as to circumvent regulatory capital 
requirements which might increase the fragility and the collapse of the system. This 
paper is related to this strand in the sense that i also examines the impact of such 
non-traditional bank activities on the fragility of the banking system.  
Section 2 provides a review of the literature of non-traditional bank 
activities, while Section 3 discusses the data and presents the empirical analysis. 
Finally, concluding remarks and policy implications are provided in section 4. 
 
2. Literature review 
       One main strand of the literature highlights t e need of the financial institutions 
to be involved in non-traditional bank activities due to the presence of gains. Myers 
and Rajan (1998) offer the differences in asset mixas an explanation for the 















traditional bank zone, differences that motivate bank managers to trade against 
banks’ interests. Cornett et al. (2002) and Deng et al. (2007) present evidence that 
non-traditional bank activities are expected to reduce the cost of debt, while Mester 
(2010) supports that banks experience high economies of scale and benefits by 
expanding their portfolio of activities into non-traditional items, while any attempt 
to restrain them from doing so would have unintended consequences.  
        By contrast, in the strand of the literature that documents the negative side of 
non-traditional bank activities, a large number of studies have stressed the negative 
side of non-traditional bank activities. More specifically, Stiroh (2004a,b) and 
Stiroh and Rumble (2006) investigate whether small U.S. banks experience 
diversification gains from being involved in non-traditional activities. The results 
reveal the negative impact of non-traditional bank related activities on banks’ 
performance, while for the case of U.S. financial holding companies they provide 
strong evidence that non-traditional bank activities contribute substantial to the 
deterioration of banks’ risk profiles. Laeven and Levine (2007) highlight that the 
diversification of activities does not bring the benefits (i.e., higher returns, efficient 
allocations of resources, and economies of scope that boost valuations) expected, 
but it intensifies agency problems across certain groups of those institutions’ 
stakeholders with further negative implications on both their profitability and their 
value. Schmid and Walter (2009) document that the banking sector, by expanding 
its functional operation into non-traditional activities, leads to predominantly value 
discounts, with the only exceptions being those where combinations between 
commercial bank and insurance activities as well as between commercial and 
investment bank activities do exist.  
         In terms of the impact of non-traditional bank activities on banks’ risk 
profiles, DeJonghe (2010) displays that banking institutions that are heavily 
involved in non-traditional activities are characteriz d by higher risks, which makes 
them more vulnerable to a number of market and macroeconomic shocks. He also 
argues that this new source of systematic risk exacerb tes not only overall financial 
instability, but also high fluctuations in the real economy. Demircqus-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2011) provide evidence that banks that highly diversify their activities 
portfolios are riskier because not only they heavily depend on non-interest income 















Brunnermeier et al. (2012) provide evidence that the components of noninterest 
income equally contribute to systematic risk, while the values of involved 
institutions are reduced across both components. DeYoung and Torna (2012) argue 
that certain components of non-traditional items, such as fee-for-service income, do 
not lead to reduced values only for the case of healt y banks, while the opposite is 
true for financially distressed institutions. Gambacorta and van Rixtel (2013) also 
argue that non-traditional bank activities have not resulted in higher profitability, 
lower earnings volatility, and lower levels of systematic risks, while any benefits 
originated from such items seem to be related to specific geographical and loan 
portfolio diversification characteristics. Their results receive empirical support by 
Fiordelisi and Marques-Ibanez (2013) who support that t e presence of positive 
effects out of diversification is limited to certain geographical bank activities as 
well as to loan portfolio diversification.  
        There is also an empirical study which does not provide clear cut results 
relative to the impact of non-traditional bank activities on banks’ risk-adjusted 
returns. In particular, Baele et al. (2007) investigate whether there are long-term 
benefits from the involvement of banking institutions into non-traditional activities. 
Their results are relatively mixed, indicating the presence of a positive effect on 
those institutions’ value and a negative (nonlinear) effect on their risk profiles, 
leading to lower risk-adjusted returns.  
        Although the above studies have focused solely n the U.S. banking system, a 
small number of others explore how the profitability and risk profiles of non-U.S. 
banks are affected by their involvement in non-tradi ional bank activities. Acharya 
et al. (2006) find significant diseconomies of scope due to the involvement of 
Italian banks in non-traditional activities, while Mercieca et al. (2007) use a sample 
of small European banks and document the presence of n gative effects derived 
from diversified bank activities. Finally, the study by Bakk-Simon et al. (2012) 
provides an overview of the non-traditional bank system in the Euro area. The size 
of this system is relatively smaller in comparison t  that of the U.S., representing 
less than half of the total assets of the banking sector. The non-traditional bank 
system in Europe is diverse across countries, reflecting differences in legal and 
regulatory structures, while securitization issuance is smaller in volume and remains 















reliance on funding from the financial sector, with t e bulk of the financing 
originating from other financial institutions (OFIs) that includes non-traditional 
bank entities.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Methodological issues 
        Following a version of the Rivard and Thomas (1997) framework, 
specifications of the profitability and risk equations capture the relationship of 
profitability and risk levels by allowing risk to contribute to the determination of 
profitability, while risk itself is determined by other bank control variables. Thus, 
the regression equations yield: 
 
ROAit = αi + β1 IRit + β2 NTRit + β3 LA it + β4 CARit + β5 NONPLit + 
              β6 HHIt + β7 Pt + β8 RCYt + β9 DUMCR * NTRit + εit       (1) 
 
IRit = αi + β10 NTRit + β11 LA it + β12 CARit + β13 NONPLit + β14 HHIt + 
          β15 Pt + β16 RCYt + β17 DUMCR * NTRit + ηit       (2) 
 
where i = 1, …, N for each bank in the panel and t = 1, …, T refers to the time 
period. The parameter αi allows for the possibility of bank-specific fixed effects. 
ROA (return of assets) defines bank’s profitability, while IR is the insolvency risk 
index. Although the primary interest is the investiga on of non-traditional bank 
activities on firms’ profitability and risk profiles, we also control for a number of 
bank-specific as well as economy-specific characteristics that could affect both 
profitability and risk profiles. In particular, NTR defines total non-traditional 
activities (defined in the Data Section), LA is the ratio of loans to assets, serving as 
a proxy for liquidity, CAR is the equity to assets ratio, NONPL is the ratio of non-
performing loans that measures the quality of the main assets of banks, HHI is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index that captures oligopolistic conditions, P proxies 
consumer prices, and RCY is real per capita income. Finally, DUMCR is a dummy 
variable that captures the recent financial crisis event and takes zero values up to 















equilibrium. The interaction term between the non-traditional bank activities and 
the crisis dummy reflects the impact of these activities during the crisis period.  
            In terms now of the model described by equations (1) and (2), profitability is 
expressed as a function of internal determinants, i.e. factors that are mainly 
influenced by a bank’s management decisions and policy bjectives, such as the 
level of liquidity, capital adequacy, and expenses management, and external 
determinants, i.e. industry-related determinants, such as the competitive degree of 
the bank sector, as well as macroeconomic-related determinants, such as economic 
growth and inflation (Athanasoglou et al., 2005). Liquidity risk is an important 
determinant of bank profitability. We would expect a positive relationship between 
liquidity and profitability (Eichengreen and Gibson, 2001). In addition, lower 
capital ratios suggest a relatively risky position, and thus we would expect a 
negative coefficient on this variable (Berger, 1995). However, higher levels of 
equity could decrease the cost of capital, leading to a positive impact on 
profitability (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992), while an increase in capital may raise 
expected earnings by reducing the expected costs of financial distress, including 
bankruptcy (Berger, 1995). The literature argues that operating expenses affect 
positively the profitability of a financial instituion (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992), 
while Mamatzakis et al. (2005) provide evidence that a non-collusive behavior 
among banks suggests the presence of a contestable m rk t.  
Finally, bank profitability is sensitive to macroeconomic conditions despite 
a larger use of financial engineering techniques to manage risks associated with 
business cycles. Higher economic growth encourages banks to lend more and 
permits them to charge higher margins as well as improving the quality of their 
assets. Neely and Wheelock (1997) use per capita income and suggest that this 
variable exerts a strong positive effect on bank earnings. Another proxy for the 
effect of the macroeconomic environment on bank profitability is inflation. The 
question is how mature an economy is so that future inflation can be accurately 
forecasted and, thus, banks can accordingly manage their operating costs. As such, 
the relationship between the inflation rate and profitability is ambiguous and 
depends on whether or not inflation is anticipated, though most studies observe a 
















Finally, we make use of the panel cointegration methodology to control for 
potential endogeneity biases as well as for omitted variable concerns. In addition to 
bank fixed effects, we also control for the clustering effect across banks, given the 
interconnectedness of banks in the non-traditional bank markets. To this end, we 
make use of the Thompson (2011) methodology which computes standard errors 
that are robust to the presence of the clustering effect.  
 
3.2. Data 
       Our dataset covers a number of full services U.S. financial institutions that are 
involved in non-traditional bank activities. Therefore, the dataset involves a wide 
range of such activities, such as structured asset-backed securities (ABS), 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) backed by loans (CDOL), CDOs backed by 
ABS (CDOABS), CDO-squareds (CDOs of CDOs of ABS)-(CDO2), CDO-cubeds 
(CDOs of CDO-squareds)-(CDO3), tender-option bonds (TOB), asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP), single-seller mortgage conduits (SMC), multi-seller 
conduits (MSC), and single-seller credit card conduits (SCC), spanning the period 
January 2000-April 2013. Data on non-traditional bank ctivities are available from 
the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States and the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York. We define as total non-traditional activities the sum of the above 
components (NTR).  
         Our panel is composed of annual data for 1,725 banks. We consider 
investment and commercial banks. Investment banks and commercial banks 
conduct much of their business within the non-tradiional bank system. It should be 
noted that the sample used is less than the total number of observations in the 
database because the information has been filtered using two criteria: (i) outliers; 
and (ii) those observations without data for any of the variables necessary for 
estimating profitability and risk profiles have been dropped. We use unconsolidated 
statements since they are preferred to avoid relevant differences in profit and loss 
statements and balance sheets of headquarters and subsi iaries compensating each 
other.     
        Following Rivard and Thomas (1997), profitab lity is measured as the bank’s 
average accounting return on assets (ROA), defined as the before-tax profits divided 















present because a bank may be unable to meet obligations to creditors. The 
insolvency risk index (IR) is a ratio in which the numerator is a measure of 
volatility of earnings and the denominator is the sum of the expected earnings plus a 
measure of the owner’s equity. Specifically, it is calculated as the standard 
deviation of ROA divided by the sum of average ROA and the average equity assets 
ratio. It is a better measure of bank risk than the volatility risk (the standard 
deviation of ROA), because it accounts for the fact that banks with the same 
volatility risk may have higher expected ROA and equity-to-asset ratios, and hence 
are less likely to be at high risk.  
          To control for all the other variables that could affect profitability, we make 
use of: the ratio of loans to assets (LA), serving as a proxy for liquidity. Capital-to-
asset ratio is another important variable affecting bank risk, proxied by the equity to 
assets ratio (CAR), while the ratio of non-performing loans measures the quality of 
the main assets of banks (NONPL). It is always true that the NOPL ratio is 
negatively related to profitability and positively related to bank risk. Next, we 
employ data for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) [on a state-wide basis] to 
capture oligopolistic conditions in the sector and consumer prices (P) and real per 
capita income (RCY) to capture the impact of macroeonomic conditions. Finally, 
we introduce a dummy variable that attempts to capture he recent financial crisis 
event (DUMCR) and takes zero values up to 2006, and one onwards. Bank data are 
obtained from the BankScope database, while the HHIand the macroeconomic 
variables are obtained from the Bloomberg database. 
 
3.3. Results  
         We begin with examining the order of integration for each variable using 
several panel unit root tests: Levin and Lin (2002), Harris and Tzavalis (1999), 
Maddala and Wu (1999), Breitung (2000) and Hadri (2000). The three non-panel 
variables (i.e., HHI, P and RCY) are tested through the ADF Dickey-Fuller test. 
The results (available upon request) show that all v riables under study are 
characterized as I(1) variables. Given that the respective variables are integrated of 
order one, we estimate the Pedroni (1999; 2004) heterogeneous panel cointegration 















cointegration findings (also available upon request) reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration at the 1% significance level in both equations.  
 Next, the fully modified OLS (FMOLS) estimation approach for 
heterogeneous cointegrated panels is estimated to determine the long-run 
equilibrium relationship. As shown in Table 1 and in terms of equation (1), the 
results show that the coefficient of non-traditional b nk activities exerts a positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level effect on profitability. In particular, a 
dollar increase in non-traditional bank activities increases profitability by 11.6 
cents, while in terms of equation (2) a dollar increase in non-traditional bank 
activities leads to 15.9 cents increase in insolvency risk. According to Baltagi et al. 
(2012), cross-sectional dependence is not much of a problem in micro panels (with 
few years and large number of cases), therefore, our res lts could be used in a valid 
manner. Finally, when we ran the FMOLS regressions without the NTR variable, 
then both R2s decreased substantially from 0.56 and 0.56 to 0.47 and 0.42 for the 
profitability and risk equations, respectively. 
The empirical findings confirm theoretical arguments that banks use their 
capital to co-invest in newly securitized loans (Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2008; 
Schleifer and Vishny, 2010). At the same time, the fact that banks also expand their 
leverage to perform those purchases, tends to increase the risk of having to liquidate 
their portfolio holdings at below fundamental values when any problem (either from 
the internal or the external environment) arises, with such liquidations to further 
destabilizing not only security prices, but also lending terms and, finally, the real 
economy.  
The results are also linked to Adrian and Shin’s (2008) theory of procyclical 
leverage and credit availability based on the optimizing behavior of financial 
intermediaries in which volatility is shown to be countercyclical, allowing banks to 
take more leveraged bets (higher risks) when experience higher profitability. In 
addition, our findings are associated to the Boot and Ratnovski (2012) arguments, 
according to which, non-traditional bank activities create frictions, i.e., time 
inconsistencies in the allocation of capital between long-term businesses and short-
term trading activities that undermine the relationship franchise and risk-shifting 















shareholders are high. As a result, banks can overexpos  themselves to trading, 
compared to what is socially optimal, or ex ante optimal, for their shareholders. 
 The findings are partially consistent to those reach d by a number of studies 
in the literature (Laeven and Levin, 2005; Stiroh, 2004a,b; among others) relative to 
the fact that non-traditional activities have a positive and statistically significant 
impact on banks’ performance (i.e. profitability), while they also affect positively 
their risk profiles, thus, intensifying agency problems. Although the primary interest 
of those banks is to exploit economies of scope in their financial intermediation 
activities by diversifying their portfolio of activities, it seems that on an aggregate 
level such economies of scope are strong enough to compensate for the negative 
results (i.e., on risk profiles) associated with such non-traditional activities. Our 
empirical findings are also partially consistent to th se reached by Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2009) who document that such non-traditional activities add to 
revenues, but they simultaneously further increase b nks’ risks. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The significance of the interaction term between no-traditional bank activities and 
the crisis dummy signifies that non-traditional banking has been largely exposed to 
the recent financial crisis. In particular, both the negative coefficient of the 
interaction term in equation (1) and the positive co fficient of the interaction term 
in equation (2) document that non-traditional banking s vulnerable and fragile to 
run-like events. A number of core funding markets froze up as financial institutions 
lost the confidence to lend to one another. For instance, borrowing limits were 
reduced, the terms of transactions shortened, haircuts on private securities were 
accepted as collateral widened, and the range of securiti s accepted as collateral 
narrowed down to all but the safest, while markets for various asset-backed 
securities collapsed, i.e. especially, markets for mortgage-backed securities and 
various other structured products essentially closed. Finally and in terms of the 
control variables, the signs turn out to be as theoretically expected.  
 
3.4 Robustness  
We embark upon a number of robustness tests to invest gate the validity of 















profitability and risk profiles, to the role of the size, to the individual contribution of 
each item involved in the non-traditional activities to such performance, to the 
separation between investment and commercial banks, and  to the quantitative 
investigation over the period before and after the recent financial crisis event. 
It is well recognized that large banks tend to be more active in engaging in 
non-traditional banking due to the complexity of products involved and the 
associated costs in acquiring such knowledge (Claessens et al., 2012). In addition, 
size is expected to affect profitability and risk profiles through economies of scale 
(Lang and Stulz, 1994), while large banks involved in both traditional and non-
traditional activities are characterized by organiztional deficiencies related to 
different technologies employed (Williamson, 1988; Stein, 2002; Mercieca et al., 
2007), while small banks are less active participants i  non-traditional banking. 
Therefore, we test whether the obtained results above can vary with bank size by 
making explicitly the distinction between large and small banks. The criterion for 
separating the aggregate sample of banks into two subsamples is the median of their 
assets. All banks above the median are classified as large banks (i.e., 357 banks), 
while those below the median are classified as small banks (i.e., 1,368 banks). The 
new panel FMOLS estimates are reported in Table 2. They show that the impact of 
non-traditional bank activities (NTR) on both the profitability and risk profiles turns 
out to be stronger for the case of large banks vis-à-vis the case of small banks (i.e., 
in terms of profitability, the figures are 0.196 vs 0.057 for large and small banks, 
respectively, while in terms of risk, the figures are 0.188 vs 0.061 for large and 
small banks, respectively). Finally, at the bottom f the table we report a test to 
investigate the difference in estimated coefficients on profitability and risk across 
large and small banks, with p-values shown in brackets. The test confirms that the 
difference in the estimated coefficients is significant in both the profitability and 
risk cases. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
To ensure the robustness of our results, we also consider alternative measures of 
profitability and risk profiles. In particular, profitability is defined as Return on 
Equity (ROE) and as the interest margin, i.e. the diff rence between banks’ interest 















interest rate spread. The net interest margin is generally seen as a very reliable 
measure of banks' long-term revenue structure (Purnanandam, 2007). Despite the 
rising importance of fee-based income as a proportion of total income, interest 
margins remain a key element of bank net cash flows and after-tax earnings. In 
other words, despite earnings diversification, variations in interest income remain a 
key determinant of changes in the profitability for the majority of banking 
institutions. In terms of the risk profile, alternatively we use the measure of the 
liquidity risk, proxied by the TED spread (TED). Non-traditional banking creates 
conditions for the conversion and aggregation of liquidities. This kind of the high-
risk operation system is an underlying danger for the sudden interruption and 
collapse of the entire financial system, as it was the case during the recent financial 
crisis. During economic downturns, these hidden risks are exposed and indefinitely 
enlarged. The new stream of FMOLS estimates are reported in Table 3. Once again, 
the estimates provide similar results.   
Additionally, we consider how a popular measure of bank risk affects the 
empirical findings reached above. This alternative m asure of bank risk is the 
Sharpe ratio (SHARPE), defined as the excess mean return on equity (with the risk-
free rate represented by the 3-month Treasury bill) divided by the standard 
deviation of the return on equity (Demircuc-Kunt and Huisinga, 2009), i.e. the 
Sharpe ratio is a risk-adjusted rate of return. With data on 3-month T-bills and bank 
equity prices (obtained from the Bloomberg database), the results show that the 
coefficient of non-traditional bank activities exerts a positive and statistically 
significant effect on profitability. In particular, a dollar increase in non-traditional 
bank activities increases profitability by 12.7 cents, while a dollar increase in non-
traditional bank activities leads to 16.4 cents increase in the Sharpe ratio. Therefore, 
the results remain qualitatively similar, albeit they indicate a stronger impact of the 
non-traditional bank activities on both the profitab lity and risk profiles. The results 
generally remain consistent with the idea that non-traditional bank activities have a 
simultaneous positive impact on both the profitability and risk profiles of banking 
institutions. Such activities, as a diversification channel, add to the risk undertaken 
by market investors and do not reduce the risk-taking of market participants, 















portfolios are associated with a higher probability of insolvency and lower risk-
adjusted returns.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
In this strand of robustness testing we consider th explicit categories included in 
the definition of non-traditional items and defined in the Data Section. In particular, 
we make use of the nine-way taxonomy of non-traditional items that will allow us 
to estimate the impact of certain separate non-traditional channels could have on 
profitability and risk. Therefore, we consider the individual (disaggregated) effects 
of the nine components of the NTR variable along with the definitions of 
profitability and risk as ROA and IR, respectively. After testing and confirming the 
presence of cointegration (the results are available upon request), the effects of each 
non-traditional bank activity on profitability (Panel 1) and risk (Panel 2) are 
reported in Table 4. They show that there is not a unified behavior across the 
components of such (disaggregated) non-traditional bank activities. In eight out of 
ten components (i.e., ABS, CDOL, CDOABS, CDO2, CDO3, TOB, SMC, and 
MSC) there is a statistically significant value-creating and risk-increasing empirical 
finding, albeit it is smaller vis-à-vis the aggregate outcomes reported in Table 1. A 
potential explanation for this line of differentiation may be lying on the fact that the 
eight non-traditional components require banks to take relatively long-term stakes 
in assets, while the opposite is true for the remaining two components. 
Alternatively, considering that our analysis includes the recent financial crisis event, 
while the former group involves mortgage-backed securities which comprise the 
market that ignited this event, the empirical results highlight the importance of 
mortgage-related items for the documented positive mpact on risk, emerging from 
rapid declines in the prices of mortgage-related securities (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 
2008). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
This part of robustness testing performs an additional test of the baseline results 
displayed in Table 1. In particular, it considers the separation between investment 
(21) and commercial banks (1,704). A growing majority of studies are finding 















activities experience increased risk-taking (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). In 
addition, streams of non-interest revenues appear to be more volatile than traditional 
loan-based revenue streams and highly expose investment banks to risk from 
increased operating leverage (DeYoung and Roland, 2001). After testing and 
confirming the presence of cointegration (the results are again available upon 
request) for both types of banks, the new results for investment banks (Panel 1) and 
commercial banks (Panel 2) are reported in Table 5. The results document that the 
impact of non-traditional bank activities retains the positive signs for both the 
profitability (ROA) and the insolvency risk (IR) vari bles. However, the impact of 
such activities turns out to be stronger for the case of investment banks, indicating 
that such activities are associated with higher systematic risks for investment vs 
commercial banks. We also report a test for the difference in estimated coefficients 
on profitability and risk, with p-values shown in brackets. The test confirms that the 
difference in the estimated coefficients for investment and commercial banks is 
statistically significant. 
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Finally, in this strand of robustness testing we split our sample into two periods. We 
refer to the period from 2000 to 2006 as ‘the pre-crisis’ period, and the period from 
2007 to 2013 as “the post-crisis” period. Bank failure studies have concluded that 
bank failures have been intensified during the recent financial crisis (Altunbas et al., 
2011; Cole and White 2012). After confirming again the presence of cointegration 
in both periods (the results are available upon request), the new empirical findings 
over the first period (Panel 1) and over the second period (Panel 2) are displayed in 
Table 6. The results indicate that over the post-cri is period, the impact of non-
traditional bank activities on profitability tends to be weaker (0.214 vs 0.126), while 
it turns out to be stronger on the insolvency risk (0.085 vs 0.138). Finally, the table 
reports a test for the difference in estimated coeffici nts over the pre- and post-crisis 
periods, with p-values shown in brackets. The test confirms that the difference in 
the estimated coefficients for the pre- and post-cri is period is significant in both the 
profitability and risk cases. 
The new findings document that the impact of financi l risis event seems to 















emergence of systematic risks. Over the post-crisis period, banks experienced an 
increase in their riskiness and a decrease in theirprofitability as the risks they had 
undertaken before the eruption of the crisis materilized. At the same time, after the 
eruption of the crisis they continued to be involved in risky non-traditional activities 
and were not optimizing their business lines. They w re simply trying to stay afloat, 
with their balance sheets and income statements being largely determined by the 
binding external constraints they were facing. This stressed situation largely 
contributed to a stronger impact on their insolvency risks and potentially increased 
the chances that these banks could fail. The financal crisis highlighted that such 
non-traditional bank activities embraced higher systematic risks, leading to a worse 
trade-off between profitability (returns) and insolvency risks. The new evidence 
also indicates that banks failed to properly internalize the associated risks in their 
individual decision-making processes, supporting the introduction of stronger 
macro-prudential policies and more efficient regulatory frameworks. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
This research paper studied the quantitative influece of non-traditional 
bank activities on profitability and insolvency risk for a number of U.S. financial 
institutions involved in such activities over the priod January 2000-April 2013. 
The methodology of panel cointegration found that the introduction of non-
traditional banking directly affects (positively) profitability and (positively) 
insolvency risk, suggesting that this type of activities is relevant for the fragility and 
the future of the entire banking system. Our results were robust to a number of 
robustness tests related to alternative definitions f r profitability and risk profiles, 
the role of the size, the contribution of individual non-traditional items, the 
separation between commercial and investment banks, and the separation of the 
time span into the period before and after the recent risis event.  
The empirical findings seem to partially disagree with traditional arguments 
put forward by the theory of intermediations about the positive effects that banking 
institutions can experience by diversifying their portfolio of activities. The results 
also provide support to the question posed in the majority of studies in the relevant 















the risk profile of banking institutions, they continue such a diversification strategy. 
The earlier empirical literature on risk-adjusted retu ns provided overwhelming 
pertinent evidence, without employing the high-powered econometric techniques of 
this paper. Moreover, arguments in favor of such movements included improved 
earnings stability, improved X-efficiencies, and improved scale and scope 
economies. Coyne et al. (2004), however, argued that such expectations had been 
overestimated.  
In relevance to the implications derived from our empirical findings, the 
results could serve as a pre-warning function that sends a clear message to 
regulators about the potential systemic risk that exists within the financial markets. 
Regulators should expand and intensify their superviso y resources over banks 
involved in non-traditional activities. Basel III requirements are not the sole answer. 
The recent crash was originated outside the traditional bank activities zone, while 
Basel III does not intervene in the banks’ business model, but only imposes certain 
capital and liquidity constraints that depend entirly on the riskiness of banks’ 
business. Hence, how to regulate the whole financial system, in a way that the 
systematic risk can be minimized, becomes the next challenge for regulators.  
Potential venues for future research involve the investigation of volatility 
spillovers across traditional and non-traditional bnking as well as the inclusion of 
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Table 1. FMOLS estimates: Baseline results. The model is described by: 
ROAit = αi + β1 IRit + β2 NTRit + β3 LA it + β4 CARit + β5 NONPLit + β6 HHIt + β7 Pt + 
              β8 RCYt + β9 DUMCR * NTRit + εit        
IRit = αi + β10 NTRit + β11 LA it + β12 CARit + β13 NONPLit + β14 HHIt + β15 Pt + β16 RCYt + 
         β17 DUMCR * NTRit + ηit     
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
     ROA    IR 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 IR   -0.086    __ 
    (-9.83)* 
NTR    0.116  0.159 
     (7.82)* (11.5)* 
LA    0.078  -0.067 
     (5.74)* (-6.72)* 
CAR    0.079  -0.116 
     (5.47)* (-6.45)* 
NONPL  -0.085  0.226 
    (-6.58)* (7.49)* 
HHI    0.086  -0.092 
     (5.49)* (-6.42)* 
P    0.074  0.085 
     (5.61)* (5.96)* 
RCY    0.093  -0.096 
     (7.13)* (-6.38)* 
DUMCR*NTR  -0.217  0.084 
    (-5.68)* (6.15)* 
R2     0.56  0.56 
R2 (without the NTR)  0.47  0.42 
 ________________________________________________________ 
Notes: NTR=total non-traditional activities, ROA=average accounting return on assets, 
IR=the insolvency risk index, NTR=total non-traditional activities, LA=the ratio of loans to 
assets, CAR=the equity to assets ratio, NONPL=the ratio of non-performing loans, HHI=the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, P=consumer prices, RCY=real per capita income, DUMCR=a 
dummy variable that captures the recent financial crisis event and takes zero values up to 
2006, and one onwards. The interaction term between th  on-traditional bank activities and 
the crisis dummy reflects the impact of these activities during the crisis period. 















  Table 2. FMOLS estimates: Large vs small banks 
______________________________________________________________   
     Large banks     Small banks 
        ROA        IR          ROA  IR 
_________________________________________________________ 
IR         -0.127       ___        -0.062          ___ 
         (-8.46)*         (-5.17)* 
NTR          0.196      0.188         0.057        0.061 
          (8.36)*     (10.4)*        (5.32)*       (5.48)* 
LA          0.115     -0.122         0.062          -0.081 
          (7.35)*    (-6.39)*        (4.84)*       (-5.26)* 
CAR          0.108     -0.146         0.058        -0.116 
          (6.19)*    (-6.91)*        (4.95)*       (-5.18)* 
NONPL        -0.239      0.284        -0.118       0.205 
         (-8.91)*     (7.82)*       (-5.33)*       (6.24)* 
HHI          0.095      -0.114         0.052       -0.077 
          (6.18)*    (-6.86)*        (5.09)*       (-5.52)* 
P          0.087      0.094         0.049           0.071 
          (6.25)*     (6.33)*        (5.16)*       (5.28)* 
RCY          0.147     -0.129         0.109        -0.104 
          (8.83)*    (-6.85)*        (5.36)*       (-5.42)* 
DUMCR*NTR        -0.264      0.119        -0.217         0.106 
         (-5.94)*     (7.06)*       (-5.61)*       (6.36)* 
R2                                         0.62     0.61         0.51          0.50 
Difference of 
Coefficients 
Large-Small   ROA: [0.01]  IR: [0.01] 
________________________________________________________ 






















          Table 3. FMOLS estimates: Alternative measures of profitability and risk 
______________________________________________________________ 
     ROE  TED     INT  TED 
          ______________________________________________________________ 
           TED  -0.079  ____   -0.066  ____ 
   (-7.62)*    (-5.48)* 
           NTR   0.105  0.142    0.117   0.136 
    (6.69)* (9.45)*    (6.12)*  (6.28)* 
           LA   0.071            -0.062    0.065  -0.071 
    (5.58)*          (-6.28)*    (5.49)* (-6.53)* 
           CAR   0.072            -0.139    0.063  -0.144 
    (6.14)*          (-5.61)*    (5.77)* (-5.26)* 
           NONPL -0.076  0.212   -0.082   0.253 
   (-6.30)* (6.53)*   (-6.81)*  (6.22)* 
           HHI   0.069            -0.078    0.058  -0.071 
    (5.83)*          (-6.25)*    (5.48)* (-5.49)* 
           P   0.071  0.079    0.078   0.073 
    (5.82)* (5.48)*    (5.61)*  (5.66)* 
           RCY   0.068           -0.114    0.094  -0.137 
    (6.73)*          (-6.87)*    (6.52)* (-6.28)* 
           DUMCR*NTR -0.202  0.082   -0.239   0.073 
   (-5.91)* (5.77)*   (-6.34)*  (5.19)* 






























Table 3 continued 
________________________________________________________ 
    ROA           SHARPE     
            _____________________________________________________________ 
           SHARPE -0.103  ____    
   (-5.91)*     
           NTR   0.127  0.164    
    (6.25)* (6.53)*    
           LA   0.096            -0.085    
    (5.85)*          (-6.89)*    
           CAR   0.091            -0.162    
    (6.48)*          (-5.94)*    
           NONPL -0.085  0.247    
   (-5.74)* (6.97)*    
           HHI   0.075            -0.088    
    (5.72)*          (-6.70)*    
           P   0.083  0.092    
    (5.62)* (5.89)*    
           RCY   0.074           -0.135    
    (6.82)*          (-6.91)*    
           DUMCR*NTR -0.253  0.096    
   (-6.19)* (5.92)*    
           R2                                  0.56  0.57    
________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ROE=Return on Equity (ROE), INT=risk: the interest margin, TED=TED spread, 






























Table 4. FMOLS estimates: Disaggregated items 
___________________________________________________________________ 
NTR:     ABS      CDOL    CDOABS     CDO2     CDO3     TOB     ABCP     SMC    MSC       SCC 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. ROA 
IR        -0.084     -0.057        -0.066         -0.072     -0.063     -0.079     -0.026     -0.082   -0.070    -0.019 
           (-5.24)*  (-5.16)*     (-4.97)*       (-5.18)*   (-5.06)*  (-5.63)*   (1.04)     (-6.12)* (-5.93)*  (-0.64) 
NTR     0.095      0.105          0.083      0.092      0.104      0.081      0.016      0.105     0.109     0.036      
            (6.12)*   (5.58)*      (6.28)*     (5.84)*    (5.72)*   (6.25)*    (1.03)      (6.35)*  (5.61)*   (1.13) 
LA        0.082     0.091  0.072      0.084       0.092      0.083      0.078      0.094    0.105     0.061 
            (4.81)*   (5.73)* (5.93)*     (6.32)*    (5.44)*    (6.15)*    (5.49)*   (4.94)*  (5.93)*   (5.46)* 
CAR      0.065    0.115  0.094      0.124       0.096      0.113      0.106      0.085    0.117     0.075 
            (6.43)*   (5.18)* (5.38)*     (5.69)*    (4.83)*    (6.12)*    (5.27)*    (5.62)*  (4.82)*  (4.91)* 
NONPL-0.064   -0.084 -0.096     -0.104      -0.075     -0.064    -0.073     -0.110   -0.116    -0.064 
           (-5.34)* (-6.31)*       (-6.15)*     (-5.38)*   (-5.49)*  (-4.81)*  (-5.19)*   (-5.61)* (-4.94)* (-5.22)* 
HHI      0.053     0.081  0.064      0.059       0.082       0.065     0.079      0.103    0.074     0.055 
            (5.32)*  (6.51)*        (5.86)*      (5.93)*    (5.88)*    (4.93)*   (6.14)*    (5.58)*  (4.72)*  (4.39)* 
P          0.053     0.062  0.073      0.081       0.074       0.081     0.046      0.095    0.082     0.059 
            (5.26)*  (5.80)*        (5.12)*      (5.37)*    (6.04)*    (5.62)*   (4.39)*    (5.42)*  (5.71)*  (4.62)* 
RCY     0.082    0.094  0.072      0.109       0.122       0.074     0.031      0.071    0.085     0.036 
            (6.30)* (6.73)* (6.27)*      (6.83)*    (5.84)*    (6.48)*   (4.55)*    (5.61)*  (5.73)*  (4.29)* 
DUMCR*NTR  
          -0.173    -0.075 -0.127    -0.131       -0.094     -0.086    -0.054     -0.105   -0.079    -0.052 
           (-5.16)* (-5.35)* (-6.48)*      (-5.92)*    (-5.27)*   (-5.60)*  (-4.32)*   (-5.73)* (-5.48)* (-3.86)* 
R2             0.38       0.42  0.39      0.42          0.40        0.41       0.33        0.48      0.40       0.34 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
2. IR 
NTR    0.072     0.084            0.069      0.086      0.092       0.096      0.023      0.109    0.095     0.025      
           (5.23)*  (5.84)*         (5.85)*     (5.45)*     (5.29)*   (6.58)*    (1.19)     (6.58)*  (5.48)*   (1.20) 
LA     -0.077    -0.083 -0.066     -0.072     -0.080     -0.075     -0.066     -0.072   -0.095    -0.048 
          (-4.28)*  (-5.32)* (-5.37)*    (-6.25)*   (-5.63)*   (-6.54)*  (-5.92)*   (-5.48)* (-5.36)* (-5.68)* 
CAR   -0.058   -0.087 -0.076     -0.094     -0.068     -0.083     -0.085     -0.093   -0.087    -0.052 
          (-6.36)*  (-5.84)* (-5.85)*    (-5.94)*   (-4.39)*   (-6.26)*   (-5.71)*  (-5.28)* (-5.24)* (-4.16)* 
NONPL 0.059   0.081  0.085      0.094      0.072      0.049      0.066       0.085    0.086     0.048 
           (5.48)*  (6.15)*          (6.52)*     (5.85)*    (5.94)*    (4.75)*   (5.94)*     (5.11)*  (4.45)*  (5.36)* 
HHI    -0.061    -0.062 -0.072     -0.082     -0.074     -0.053     -0.093     -0.095   -0.083    -0.042 
          (-5.24)* (-6.17)*        (-5.60)*     (-5.36)*   (-5.62)*  (-4.38)*  (-6.45)*   (-5.84)* (-5.26)* -(4.98)* 
P         0.064     0.073  0.081      0.073       0.06       0.075     0.069      0.091     0.061     0.048 
           (5.66)*  (5.26)*         (5.28)*      (5.74)*    (5.45)*    (5.23)*   (4.25)*    (5.21)*  (5.14)*  (4.21)* 
RCY  -0.066    -0.076 -0.059     -0.093      -0.072    -0.052    -0.034     -0.063    -0.075    -0.029 
          (-5.03)* (-6.31)* (-5.73)*     (-6.31)*   (-5.44)*  (-5.82)*  (-4.72)*   (-5.17)* (-5.36)* (-4.95)* 
DUMCR*NTR  
           0.139    0.082 0.176     0.125        0.108      0.112     0.116      0.126     0.139     0.074 















R2             0.39       0.45  0.42      0.46          0.36        0.37       0.31        0.45      0.44       0.42 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 




































































Table 5. FMOLS estimates: Investment vs commercial banks 
_________________________________________________________ 
   Investment banks   Commercial banks 
    ROA   IR    ROA    IR 
_________________________________________________________ 
IR  -0.107   __   -0.073   ___ 
   (-5.32)*    (-5.21)* 
NTR   0.138  0.193    0.084   0.161 
    (6.29)* (7.54)*    (5.44)*  (6.40)* 
LA   0.061  -0.058    0.095  -0.053 
    (5.42)* (-5.23)*   (5.28)* (-5.33)* 
CAR   0.072  -0.147    0.086  -0.156 
    (5.78)* (-6.28)*   (5.80)* (-5.82)* 
NONPL  ____   ____   -0.096  0.259 
        (-6.37)*  (5.61)* 
HHI   0.106  -0.083    0.125  -0.092 
    (5.98)* (-5.91)*   (6.13)* (-5.64)* 
P   0.093  0.102    0.086   0.090 
    (5.88)* (5.63)*    (5.47)*  (5.35)* 
RCY   0.109  -0.116    0.114  -0.098 
    (6.34)* (-6.82)*   (6.45)* (-5.74)* 
DUMCR*NTR -0.274  0.125   -0.258   0.146 
   (-5.82)  (6.59)*   (-5.52)*  (6.15)* 
R2   0.59  0.58    0.52   0.50 
Difference of 
Coefficients 
Investment-Commercial ROA: [0.00]  IR: [0.00] 
_________________________________________________________ 























Table 6. FMOLS estimates: Pre-crisis vs post-crisis periods 
_________________________________________________________ 
          Pre-crisis           Post-crisis 
         ROA       IR               ROA        IR 
_________________________________________________________ 
IR  -0.049    __   -0.089    __ 
   (-5.12)*    (-5.73)* 
NTR   0.214  0.085    0.126   0.138 
    (7.22)* (6.14)*    (6.39)*  (6.43)* 
LA   0.039  -0.061    0.061  -0.068 
    (5.15)* (-5.35)*   (5.62)* (-5.74)* 
CAR   0.056  -0.102    0.104  -0.161 
    (5.14)* (-5.71)*   (6.48)* (-6.28)* 
NONPL -0.052  0.148   -0.092   0.207 
   (-5.24)* (6.12)*   (-6.47)*  (6.62)* 
HHI   0.068  -0.063    0.073  -0.068 
    (5.36)* (-5.26)*   (5.69)* (-5.31)* 
P   0.038  0.074    0.060   0.092 
    (5.06)* (5.15)*    (5.58)*  (5.83)* 
RCY   0.071  -0.087    0.094  -0.106 
    (5.26)* (-5.26)*   (6.61)* (-5.76)* 
R2   0.47  0.49    0.58   0.55 
Difference of 
Coefficients 
Pre-post  ROA: [0.03]  IR: [0.01] 
_________________________________________________________ 




















The long-term role of non-traditional banking in profitability and risk 





● We study the impact of non-traditional banking on risk-adjusted returns 
 
● 1,725 U.S. banks spanning the period 2000-2013  
 
● We make use of the methodology of panel cointegration  
 
● The results document a positive effect on risk-adjusted returns 
 
● The results are highly important for regulators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
